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Since the 1963 publication of Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar, literary scholars have consistently read this 
autobiographical novel as a story of a woman’s struggle against the oppressive social atmosphere of 
the 1950s. For instance, Linda W. Wagner calls the novel a “testimony to the repressive cultural 
mold that trapped many mid-century women” (67), and Marjorie G. Perloff claims it is “one of the 
most acute analyses of the feminist problem that we have in contemporary fiction” (512). 
Scholarship on this novel, which seems to have declined since the 1980s, tends to focus on the ways 
in which the novel’s protagonist Esther must struggle against social and cultural oppressions to 
construct her identity as a woman. Thus, these scholars primarily see her “mental illness”
1
 as a 
response to the oppressions of a patriarchal society. However, by applying the lens of disability 
theory, we can understand how Esther’s experience of mental distress is also a stigmatizing 
experience in itself, one that compounds and intensifies her experiences and struggles as a woman. 
Most scholarship on The Bell Jar was written in the 1970s and 80s, before disability as an identity 
category was widely discussed in literary studies. This scholarship approaches the novel from a 
feminist perspective and reflects the particular concerns of the eras in which it was written. For 
instance, writing in 1987 when much feminist scholarship focused on the act and politics of writing,
2
 
E. Miller Budick examines Esther’s struggle against male language, arguing that the novel embodies 
a “feminist aesthetic,” or “a language and an art competent to secure women, especially the female 
writer, against male domination” (872). Diane S. Bonds (1990) also focuses on feminist concerns of 
the novel, exploring the ways in which the novel demonstrates the oppressive effects the 
“separative” (or autonomous) model of selfhood has for women.
3
 In focusing on Esther’s struggle as 
woman, these authors most often view her depression as a response to the oppressive forces of her 
society. For Budick, who claims the novel is constructed “out of uniquely feminine experiences 
concerning specifically female themes” (873), Esther’s “madness” is one these major themes, along 
with “powerlessness, betrayal, and victimization” (872). Perloff (1972) recognizes that Esther’s 
mental distress is undoubtedly a factor in the struggles she faces in the novel, but she asserts that 
Esther’s “dilemma” is largely a result of “being a woman in a society whose guidelines for women 
she can neither accept nor reject” (511). As these scholars suggest, feminist concerns are the central 
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focus of the novel, for Plath clearly indicates that Esther’s struggle against patriarchal oppression is 
at least a contributing factor to her breakdown. Yet many of the experiences and concerns that most 
scholars identify as specifically feminine in the novel are also common concerns and experiences of 
people with disabilities. 
As many scholars have observed, there are numerous overlaps in experiences of femaleness and 
disability. As Rosemarie Garland Thomson notes, “Western thought has long conflated femaleness 
and disability, understanding both as defective departures from a valued standard. Aristotle, for 
example, defined women as ‘mutilated males’” (“Integrating Disability” 260). G. Thomas Couser also 
notes that “femaleness” and “disability” are often seen as synonymous, pointing out that physical 
impairment is often associated with “emasculation, even feminization” (185). In fact, Couser 
suggests that women are, in some sense, already considered disabled; he argues that more 
attention is generally given to stories of disabled men, while “the story of the disabled woman is 
ignored because of its apparent redundancy” (185). In addition to the historical conflation of 
femaleness and disability, many scholars have also explored the concerns and experiences shared by 
women and people with disabilities. For instance, Susan Wendell points out that many of “the same 
attitudes about the body which contribute to women’s oppression generally also contribute to the 
social and psychological disablement of people who have physical disabilities” (“Toward a Feminist 
Theory of Disability” 243), such as the idea that the body can and should be controlled. In describing 
her experience of multiple sclerosis, Nancy Mairs identifies embodiment and cultural attitudes 
about the body as a concern shared by both women and people with disabilities. As Mairs points 
out, in Western cultures, bodies are treated as “subordinates, inferior in moral status” so that 
“[o]pen association with them shames us” (53). Bodies, then, are “viewed with suspicion,” and Mairs 
argues this is especially true for the female body “since so much of it is in fact hidden, dark, secret” 
(54). As Mairs observes, these cultural assumptions about the body lead women to feel shame for 
their bodies. However, with M.S., Mairs says she feels additional shame for her body, for “it is a 
crippled body”; therefore, Mairs argues, her body “is doubly other, not merely by the homo-sexual 
standards of patriarchal culture but by the standards of physical desirability erected for every body 
in our world” (54). Thus, as Mairs suggests, her struggles as a woman are compounded and 
intensified by her experience of disability.  
A growing number of scholars have begun examining the ways in which feminist theory and 
disability theory interact in describing the experiences of disabled women,
4
 demonstrating that, as 
Wendell puts it, “disabled women struggle with both the oppressions of being women in male-
dominated societies and the oppressions of being disabled in societies dominated by the able-
bodied” (244). Although scholarship on The Bell Jar has traditionally viewed Esther’s struggles and 
experiences as specifically feminine, disability theory offers an additional perspective, one that 
views Esther’s mental distress not only a response to patriarchal oppression but also as an additional 
stigmatizing experience. Although “mental illness” is not always included in discussions of disability, 
many scholars argue for a more inclusive definition of the disability category, demonstrating that 
people with mental differences share many of the same concerns, oppressions, and experiences as 
people with physical differences. 
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This more inclusive definition is a recent development in disability theory, which is itself a relatively 
new field in cultural studies. As Lennard Davis notes, “[a]lthough the category has existed for a long 
time, its present form as a political and cultural formation has only been around since the 1970s, 
and has come into some kind of greater visibility since the late 1980s” (10). Writing in 1997, 
Thomson argues that disability as an identity category has still been largely ignored by scholars: 
“Although much recent scholarship explores how difference and identity operate in such politicized 
constructions as gender, race, and sexuality, cultural and literary criticism has generally overlooked 
the related perceptions of corporeal otherness” (Extraordinary Bodies 5). As disability theory 
continues to develop, many scholars still disagree as to which conditions are included in the 
category of disability; for instance, not all agree with the inclusion of acute and chronic illnesses, as 
well as mental distress. As Peter Beresford points out, “[t]here does not seem to be any agreement 
in disability discourse whether or not madness, distress and psychiatric system survivors are part of 
the discussion” (168). However, many leading disability scholars, including Thomson, adopt a much 
broader definition of the disability category while still retaining the differences between the various 
forms: 
This is not to suggest that all forms of disability are interchangeable or that all disabled 
people experience their bodies or negotiate their identities in the same ways….Disability 
is an overarching and in some ways artificial category that encompasses congenital and 
acquired physical differences, mental illness and retardation, chronic and acute 
illnesses, fatal and progressive diseases, temporary and permanent injuries, and a wide 
range of bodily characteristics considered disfiguring, such as scars, birthmarks, unusual 
proportions, or obesity. (Extraordinary Bodies 13) 
Like Thomson, Wendell prefers a more inclusive definition of disability; in critiquing the United 
Nations’ definition of disability,
5
 she finds the fact that “they are general enough to include many 
conditions that are not always recognized by the general public as disabling” to be one of the two 
positive aspects of the definition
6
 (The Rejected Body 13). 
Wendell also discusses the exclusion of some chronic and life-threatening illnesses, as well as 
mental distress, from the disability category, noting that “some of the initial opposition…may have 
come from an understandable desire to avoid the additional stigma of illness,” including that 
associated with “psychological or developmental disorders” (21). And as Beresford, G. Gifford, and 
C. Harrison note in their 1996 essay “What Has Disability Got to Do with Psychiatric Survivors?” 
opposition to inclusion can come front both sides:  
Many psychiatric system survivors are unwilling to see themselves as disabled. They 
associate disability with the medicalisation of their distress and experience. They reject 
the biological and genetic explanations of their distress imposed by medical experts. 
They may not see themselves as emotionally or mentally distressed either, but instead 
celebrate their difference and their particular perceptions. Similarly, some disabled 
people do not feel that psychiatric survivors are disabled, because they do not have a  
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physical impairment or their situation is not permanent. There are also fears and 
anxieties on both sides of being lined with the negatives that are often associated with 
the other. (qtd. in Beresford 169) 
Despite such resistance to including “mental illness,” or mental distress, in the disability category, 
Beresford contends that the relationship between psychiatric system survivors and disability cannot 
be ignored. Not only are psychiatric system survivors most often lumped together with other people 
with disabilities by governmental and other externally imposed definitions, but Beresford also 
contends that there are “significant overlaps between the two populations” (169); for instance, 
many psychiatric system survivors develop physical impairments, often as a result of medications 
and other treatments, and many people with disabilities experience mental and emotional distress. 
Although Beresford emphasizes that there are also significant differences between people with 
physical disabilities and psychiatric system survivors, he contends that “this does not mean that 
survivors are outside of or separate from disability or should not be included as part of the 
discussion” (170), for differences exist even among people typically considered to be disabled. 
Similarly, Wendell points out that no disabled person is completely disabled; someone with a 
physical impairment may be completely healthy, and a person with a chronic and/or life-threatening 
illness may have no physical impairment. Even physical disability itself encompasses a wide range of 
conditions—including paraplegia, amputation, and deformities (21). Therefore, it is possible to 
include mental distress in the disability category without ignoring its inherent differences from 
physical disability. 
The similarities in experiences of mental distress, like those of Esther Greenwood in The Bell Jar, and 
experiences of physical disability further complicate an absolute distinction between the two kinds 
of conditions. As Beresford points out, people with physical disabilities and psychiatric system 
survivors face similar oppressions, for “the denial of their human and civil rights is a shared 
experience of disabled people and survivors” (170-71). Like people with physical impairments, 
people with mental distress are stigmatized and cast as “other,” and as the social model of disability 
theory asserts, it is this exclusion of difference that creates and constructs disability. Scholars like 
Tom Shakespeare have explored the development and usefulness of the social model of disability, a 
term first coined in 1983 by Mike Oliver (Shakespeare 198). As Shakespeare explains, this model 
distinguishes between impairment and disability, defining impairment as the actual physical 
difference and disability as a social construction, “a relationship between people with impairments 
and a disabling society” (198). Thus, disability is not a direct result of the physical, mental, or 
emotional difference that defines the condition; instead, it is the result of an environment that does 
not accommodate all bodies equally. As Thomson argues, “Stairs, for example, create a functional 
‘impairment’ for wheelchair users that ramps do not. Printed information accommodates the 
sighted but ‘limits’ blind persons” (Extraordinary Bodies 7). Furthermore, Wendell points out that 
“normal” ability is culturally dependent, for “[h]ow much ability is basic, like how much ability is 
normal, seems to depend on how much is necessary to perform the most common tasks of daily 
living in a particular physical and social environment” (The Rejected Body 16). For instance, living in 
societies without modern technological advancements requires more physical ability and stamina.
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Although these scholars focus specifically on physical difference, Anne Wilson and Beresford 
demonstrate that a similar socially constructed nature exists in “mental illness.” Wilson and 
Beresford argue that although “madness and distress” are interpreted as mental illness by 
psychiatry and popular media, individuals should not be classified as either “normal” or “mentally 
ill”; instead, these scholars assert that the mental and emotional distress experienced by those 
considered to be “mentally ill” should be seen as “part of a broader continuum of distress and well-
being; a continuum upon which all people would place themselves, in different positions and at 
different times in their lives” (144). In exploring the connections between psychiatry and disability 
activism, Bradley Lewis also addresses the social model in relation to “mental difference,” pointing 
out that the “task of undermining stereotyped representations of individualism, medicalization, and 
normality” (340), which is a goal of the social model in disability theory, is also a task central to 
psychiatry disability activism. 
Although the social model still seems to dominate contemporary disability discourse,
7
 some scholars 
have begun to question the continued usefulness of the social model for disability theory. For 
instance, Shakespeare recognizes many strengths of this model, including its political effectiveness, 
that it identifies social barriers, and that it improves the self-esteem of disabled people (199), but he 
he also identifies numerous flaws. For example, he points out that this model’s distinction between 
impairment and disability is largely artificial, for “in everyday life, it is very hard to distinguish clearly 
between the impact of impairment, and the impact of social barriers” (201). Furthermore, although 
disabled people face both social discrimination and the “intrinsic limitations” of their impairments 
(202), the social model generally ignores the importance of impairment in the lives of disabled 
people, almost suggesting that impairment poses no problems. Tobin Siebers also points out that 
the social model largely ignores the reality of physical impairment, arguing that it does not fully 
address the “difficult realities faced by people with disabilities” (175), particularly the reality of pain. 
Considering this discussion in relation to The Bell Jar necessarily raises the question of whether 
Esther’s depression has any biological cause or if it is entirely a social construction. As scholars such 
a Phyllis Chesler have demonstrated, the mental health profession in the 1950s tended to view 
women “as somehow naturally mentally ill” (1). Speaking from her own experience as a psychiatrist, 
Chesler points out that “during the 1950s and 1960s, clinicians were still being taught that women 
suffer from penis envy” (1). Therefore, it is possible that Esther’s designation as “mentally ill” is 
largely a result of psychiatric practices of the time period. Furthermore, there is no indication in the 
novel of any biological cause for her mental distress—that she has any actual physical or mental 
impairment—for as scholars have long observed, Esther’s “mental illness” is at least in part a 
response to the oppressions she faces as a woman; if these oppressions did not exist, she might not 
suffer a breakdown or be labeled “mentally ill” at all. 
However, Beresford and Wilson argue that the social model’s concept of impairment is problematic 
for psychiatric system survivors in general, particularly the distinction drawn “between impairment 
and disability, where impairment is taken to refer to assumed biological characteristics of the body 
and mind” (155). For instance, these scholars point out that psychiatry does not rely on biological  
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characteristics in diagnosing mental illnesses: “Though the psychiatric profession has continued its 
search for biological causes or ‘genetic markers’ for ‘mental illnesses’ such as ‘schizophrenia,’ there 
is still no definitive ‘laboratory test’ for any specific ‘mental illness’” (147). Instead, psychiatrists 
must rely on diagnostic tools, “[d]espite the fact that these tools lack validity” (147).
8
 Therefore, 
Wilson and Beresford contend, mental illness cannot be seen “as the ‘given’ often accepted of 
physical/sensory impairment” (147), suggesting instead that impairment should be viewed as largely 
socially constructed as well.
9
 Ultimately, the question of whether Esther’s mental distress is rooted 
in her body or completely a product of social construction is irrelevant, for she is labeled and 
stigmatized as mentally ill, which is a disabling experience. 
Considering that Esther’s experience of mental distress is the central focus of The Bell Jar—a novel 
which the author described as the story of “a college girl building up for and going through a 
nervous breakdown” (Ames 304)—disability theory is an appropriate and necessary lens to apply in 
examining this novel. Some scholars have already noted that Esther’s psychological condition is, in 
fact, disabling; for instance, in her 2004 article “The Disabled Female Body as a Metaphor for 
Language in Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar,” Marilyn Boyer also points out that “the major depression 
that Esther experiences throws her body into a disabled state that affects all aspects of her being” 
(214). Esther also shares many of the common obstacles recognized in disability literature, such as 
stigmatization, contingency, alienation, and dissociation from the body. Although scholars like Susan 
Coyle have examined many of these aspects of the novel from the perspective of feminist criticism,
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the implications of disability theory for The Bell Jar have not been explored.
11
 However, such a 
reading is vital to a fuller understanding of the experiences and struggles of the novel’s protagonist, 
as well as those of Plath herself. As such a reading suggests, although this novel has been read 







There has been some debate over Esther’s condition among scholars, as no technical diagnosis is 
given in the novel. Some scholars, like Marilyn Boyer, refer to Esther’s condition as “depression” 
(213), though Marjorie Perloff repeatedly identifies it as “schizophrenia” (521). Many scholars 
choose to use vague terms, including Linda W. Wagner, who refers to Esther’s condition simply as 
“madness” (65). Luisa Pascual Garrido notes that there is also “no agreement as to Plath’s mental 
condition” (1). This may be at least partially a result of the predominant psychiatric practices of 
Plath’s time, which as scholars like Phyllis Chesler have demonstrated tended to view women as 
“somehow naturally mentally ill” (1). 
2
Citing scholars Elaine Showalter, Nelly Furman, Sandra M. Gilbert, and Barbara Hill Rigney, Budick 
notes that “in recent years, attention has shifted from the treatment of women in male fiction to 
the reconsideration of the act of writing and what feminist critics have variously called the ‘politics 
of language’ (Furman), ‘sexual poetics’ (Gilbert 31), or ‘sexual politics’ (Rigney)” (873). 
3
Bonds explores the notion of a “separative” or autonomous self, which she says is tied to “the 
cultural forces that oppress women” (49), in relation to The Bell Jar. According to Bonds, although 
feminist criticism has criticized this model of selfhood, most scholars approach Plath’s novel with 
these very assumptions, so they do not recognize the ways in which the novel demonstrates the 
dangerous effects this model can have for women. For example, Bonds disagrees with the common 
reading of the novel’s ending as positive, saying that Esther must “earn her exit from the asylum by 
committing herself, albeit unwittingly,” to the oppressive forces that led to her breakdown in the 
first place (49). 
4
 As scholars like Rosemarie Garland Thomson and Susan Wendell have demonstrated, although 
there are many connections between disability theory and feminist theory, feminist theory alone 
cannot address the experiences of disabled women. In her article “Integrating Disability, 
Transforming Feminist Theory,” Thomson argues that although feminist theory “investigates how 
culture saturates the particularities of bodies with meanings and probes the consequences of those 
meanings,” which is also the goal of disability theory, feminist theory has not considered the 
implications of the “ability/disability system” (258). Thomson argues that disability theory can 
deepen multiple aspects of feminist theory, largely because feminist issues are often “intricately 
entangled with disability” (257). Alexa Schriempf also notes the limitations of feminist theory for 
disabled women, asserting that when scholars include disabled women “under the general rubric of 
‘woman,’” they fail to recognize and acknowledge “the different experiences of disabled women in a 
sexist and ableist society” (54). Therefore, she argues, “the feminist critique cannot address disabled 





The following is the distinction between impairment, disability, and handicap as outlined by the UN 
in its World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons:  
Impairment: Any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical 
structure or function.  
Disability: Any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to 
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a 
human being.  
Handicap: A disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an impairment or 
disability, that limits or prevents the fulfillment of a role that is normal, depending 
on age, sex, social and cultural factors, for that individual. (6)   
Further, the programme identifies that “handicap” is related not only to impairment but also to 
environment, for “it occurs when they encounter cultural, physical or social barriers which prevent 
their access to various systems of society that are available to other citizens” (7). The UN also 
recognizes that disability is a diverse category, consisting of various conditions, all that “encounter 
different barriers, of different kinds, which have to be overcome in different ways” (7). 
6
Wendell identifies two positive aspects of the UN definitions. In addition to the inclusion of many 
conditions not universally recognized as disability, she also appreciates that the definition of 
“handicap” “explicitly recognizes the possibility that the primary causes of a disabled person’s 
inability to do certain things may be social,” such as “lack of opportunities, lack of accessibility, lack 
of services,” etc. (13). However, Wendell also offers several criticisms of the UN definitions. First, 
she believes the definitions of “disability” and “impairment” suggest “that there is some universal, 
biologically or medically describable standards of structure, function, and human physical ability” 
(14). Yet she argues that such a standard does not exist, as “normal” structure, function, or ability 
varies between societies. She also finds the UN’s definition of “handicap” problematic, as it implies 
“that women can be disabled, but not handicapped, by being unable to do things which are not part 
of the ‘normal’ roles of women in their societies” (17). For instance, many societies may only expect 
women to “function well enough to perform household duties” (17). This definition of “handicap” 
has similar implications for disabilities that result from aging: “although we may lose some ability, 
we are not ‘handicapped’ unless we cannot fulfill the roles that are normal for our age” (18). 
7
Tobin Siebers notes that the “correctness and theoretical power” of the social model “are very 
nearly unchallenged on the current academic scene” (174). 
8
Wilson and Beresford cite Herb Kutchins and Stuart Kirk’s criticism of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in their 1999 book 
Making Us Crazy: DSM—The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Illness. In this book, 
Kutchins and Kirk claim the DSM “is based on an illusion of science and is fundamentally flawed,” 
citing disagreements in creating and applying the DSM, as well as instances of the involvement of 
pharmaceutical companies in developing diagnostic categories (Wilson and Beresford 147). 
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Furthermore, Wilson and Beresford describe their own experiences of “psychiatrists’ enhanced 
interest in some aspects of our distress and the ‘playing down’ of other aspects in order that it, or 
we, conform to a specific diagnostic category and prescribed ‘treatment’” (146). 
9
Wilson and Beresford cite Paul Abberley’s 1987 article “The Concept of Oppression and the 
Development of a Social Theory of Disability,” arguing that such discussions which consider “the 
socially constructed nature of impairment” are more useful for psychiatric system survivors, “for our 
starting point cannot be the unquestioning acceptance of the reification of ‘mental illness’” (155). 
10
Susan Coyle, in examining metaphor in the novel, notes the recurring themes of alienation and 
dissociation, but she views them as reactions to the oppressions Esther’s faces as a woman, not as a 
response to her experience of mental distress. 
11
Although Marilyn Boyer does reference disability theory in relation to the novel, she focuses on 
disabilities “of a temporary nature” (200), including inebriation, poisoning, and assault, and argues 







THE BELL JAR AS DISABILITY NARRATIVE 
 
The critical lens of disability theory offers a new perspective on many aspects of Esther’s 
experiences, including the cultural responses she faces as a result of her difference. Additionally, by 
considering Arthur W. Frank’s analysis of illness narratives, we can recognize many patterns and 
tendencies in Esther’s self-perceptions that are common in disability narratives. As the social model 
of demonstrates, the meanings attached to “disabled” individuals are largely a result of societal 
definitions and limitations, not of the physical, mental, or emotional differences themselves. 
Because these differences are constructed as “other,” disabled individuals must face many forms of 
societal prejudice, from interest and curiosity to disgust and fear. As Rosemarie Garland Thompson 
asserts, since disability is “constructed as the embodiment of corporeal insufficiency and deviance,” 
the disabled body “becomes a repository for social anxieties about such troubling concerns as 
vulnerability, control, and identity” (Extraordinary Bodies 6). This anxiety regarding difference is 
seen also in response to other stigmatized identity groups, but some scholars argue that the 
prejudice against disability is even more complex. For instance, Lennard Davis points out that 
disability serves as a reminder that “identity is not fixed but malleable,” for anyone is capable of 
becoming ill or disabled (26). In fact, with modern medical advancements, life expectancy has 
increased, which will inevitably lead to an increase in rates of disability, and many scholars, including 
Davis and Thomson, assert that everyone who lives long enough will one day be disabled. 
Furthermore, Thomson argues that the fluidity of this category makes disability “more 
threatening…than such seemingly more stable marginal identities as femaleness, blackness, or 
nondominant ethnic identities” (14). Just as anyone can experience an injury resulting in physical 
impairment, no one is inherently exempt from mental and emotional distress. 
As a result of social anxieties regarding difference, mental distress and other disabilities can elicit 
multiple cultural responses. In examining common historical responses to physical difference, 
Thomson cites Mary Douglas’ “Concept of Dirt” from Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of 
Pollution and Taboo. In this study, Douglas asserts that cultural concerns with purity are at the 
foundation of every society, noting that purity is achieved through the absence of “dirt.” For  
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Douglas, dirt is defined as any deviation from societal norms, or “the by-product of a systematic 
ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements” 
(35). Although Douglas does not discuss disability in her study, Thomson argues her “interpretation 
of dirt as anomaly, as the extra-ordinary, can be extended to the body we call ‘disabled,’” for when 
compared with cultural expectations of the body, physical disability is clearly “aberrant” and 
“anomalous” (33). Likewise, cultural expectations of psychological and emotional norms cast mental 
distress as an anomaly or societal dirt. In her theory, Douglas also analyzes common cultural 
responses to dirt; according to Douglas, cultures provide a set of basic categories by which ideas and 
values are ordered, and “any system of classification must give rise to anomalies, and any given 
culture must confront events which seem to defy its assumptions” or it risks forfeiting confidence 
(48). With this assumption, Douglas identifies five ways in which cultures cope with societal dirt: 
reducing ambiguity by assigning an absolute interpretation of the anomaly, avoiding anomalous 
things, eliminating anomalies, labeling anomalies as dangerous, and incorporating anomalies into 
ritual to “enrich meaning or to call attention to other levels of existence” (41). In their discussion of 
psychiatric system survivors, Anne Wilson and Peter Beresford demonstrate that the “mentally ill” 
often face many of these cultural responses,
1
 but of these typical responses, the one most prevalent 
in The Bell Jar is avoidance through such methods as segregation. In fact, segregation seems to be 
the standard cultural response to mental difference. In Madness and Civilization: A History of 
Insanity in the Age of Reason, Michel Foucault discusses multiple methods of segregating the 
mentally ill used throughout history, some of which he attributes in part to the disappearance of 
leprosy from the Western world at the end of the Middle Ages; for centuries, leprosariums had 
spread across Europe, but as leprosy disappeared from the 14
th
 to the 17
th
 century, “Poor 
vagabonds, criminals, and ‘deranged minds’ would take the part played by the leper” (7). Before this 
time, the mentally ill were regularly driven from towns, “allowed to wander in the open 
countryside,” and later handed over to seamen who conveyed “their insane cargo from town to 
town” (8). After the disappearance of leprosy, however, “madmen” began to be housed in the 
empty hospitals, though “they were not given treatment; they were simply thrown into prison” (9-
10). 
For Esther, the main character in The Bell Jar, this confinement involves two separate mental 
hospitals, not prisons, though she is admitted involuntarily following her suicide attempt, and she 
had already observed that “the more hopeless you were, the further away they hid you” (190). Even 
after she improves and has been accepted back to her college, “the doctors vetoed [her] living with 
[her] mother in the interim” (268), forcing her to remain in the asylum until the start of the 
semester. Susanna Kaysen describes a similar experience of confinement in a mental hospital during 
the late 1960s in her memoir Girl, Interrupted (1993). After one short session with a psychiatrist she 
has never even met before, Kaysen is admitted immediately to a mental hospital, despite her 
objections. Although she is told the hospitalization will be brief, only “a couple of weeks,” she says, 
“He [the psychiatrist] tricked me….It was closer to two years” (39). In response to the doctor’s 
dishonesty, it is no wonder that Kaysen uses prison images to describe her time in the institution, 
saying, “I was behind bars” (117). Wilson and Beresford also use crime metaphors for their  
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interactions with the psychiatric field, noting that “as a psychiatric patient, it can feel as if everything 
you say or do is being taken down as evidence against you” (148). At least initially, both Kaysen and 
Esther seem to view hospitalization, not as an avenue to treatment and recovery, but as a prison 
sentence. 
Although Esther is given treatment, unlike the imprisoned madmen Foucault describes, it is not 
until she meets Dr. Nolan that the electroshock therapy seems to be effective. Her experiences with 
shock treatments even before her hospitalization are horrific and painful: 
There was a brief silence, like an indrawn breath.   
Then something bent down and took hold of me and shook me like the end of the 
world….it shrilled, through an air crackling with blue light, and with each flash a 
great jolt drubbed me till I thought my bones would break and the sap fly out of me 
like a split plant.   
I wondered what terrible thing it was that I had done. (171) 
This experience with electroshock therapy is reminiscent of the recurring references to the 
execution of the Rosenbergs, which is mentioned in the first sentence of the novel. The 
electrocution is all Esther can think about in New York City, wondering what it would be like to be 
“burned alive all along your nerves,” convinced “it must be the worst thing in the world” (1). Even 
the room where Dr. Gordon administers the treatments reminds of a prison cell presumably similar 
to the Rosenbergs’: “the windows in that part were indeed barred, and…everything that opened and 
shut was fitted with a keyhole so it could be locked up” (170). Although intended to help her, the 
electroshock therapy seems more punishment than treatment, at least to Esther. In fact, when she 
is moved to Caplan, where she meets Dr. Nolan, she is afraid of saying the wrong thing and being 
subjected to electroshock therapy again: “somewhere in this hospital, in a hidden corner, there 
reposed a machine exactly like Doctor Gordon’s, ready to jolt me out of my skin” (226). Esther 
clearly sees electroshock treatments as possible punishment for misbehavior, which is not 
surprising; before being moved from the medical hospital to the “special” psychiatric ward of 
another following her suicide attempt, she breaks a mirror, and in irritation, one nurse tells another, 
“At you-know-where they’ll take care of her!” (209). The lack of professionalism and empathy in this 
medical professional only heightens Esther’s sense of electroshock therapy as punishment rather 
than treatment. 
In addition to experiencing common cultural responses to difference, particularly segregation, 
Esther also exhibits many of the same the reactions to her disability as are common throughout 
illness and disability narratives. In The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics, Arthur W. 
Frank examines illness narratives, both his own and those told by others, to demonstrate that 
storytelling is one way of coping with illness and disability, for stories help “[transform] fate into 
experience” (xi). Although fictional, The Bell Jar is Plath’s attempt to accomplish this transformation. 
According to A. Alvarez, a poet and critic who developed a friendship with Plath, she described The 
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Bell Jar “as an autobiographical apprentice-work which she had to write in order to free herself from 
the past” (19). Presumably, writing this novel enabled Plath to transform her own “fate” into 
“experience.” Although Frank is concerned with autobiographical stories, his “tool kit” can be useful 
in examining fictional representations of illness and disability as well. Furthermore, Frank recognizes 
any story can contain an element of fiction: “The stories we tell about our lives are not necessarily 
those lives as they were lived, but these stories become our experience of those lives” (22). And The 
Bell Jar certainly has an autobiographical element, for many of Esther’s experiences—the death of 
her father from illness, the guest editorship in New York City, the hospitalization and electroshock 
therapy—are based on Plath’s life (Ames).
2
 
In his analysis of illness narratives, Frank identifies four problems bodies encounter in illness: 
control, the ability to control one’s body; body-relatedness, the relationship of one’s body to one’s 
sense of self; other-relatedness, the relationship of one’s body to other bodies; and desire, both the 
act of wanting and the ways in which that desire is expressed for, with, and through one’s body. 
Esther faces each of these problems in her struggle with depression, and while Esther’s encounters 
with these problems may also be related to the oppressions she faces as a woman, these problems 
are also intensified by her experience of mental distress. Frank emphasizes that although “illness 
requires new and more self-conscious solutions to these problems,” they are “general body 
problems” that everyone—well or ill, able-bodied or disabled—faces throughout life (29). But 
because bodies demand extra attention in illness or disability, these general body problems can 
become more acute in narratives of experiences with illness and disability. 
As the bodies of wounded storytellers are embodiments of contingency, control is an obvious 
problem for ill and disabled bodies. Even before her breakdown, Esther’s lack of control is 
emphasized outwardly in such events as her rejection from the writing course or Marco’s near-rape 
of her in New York City. From almost the first moment she meets Marco, his intentions are clear; in 
handing her his diamond stick pin, he says, “Perhaps…I shall perform some small service…worthy of 
a diamond” (125). By giving Esther this gift (which he later takes back), Marco assumes he will be 
reimbursed, and his use of physical force suggests he will receive payment, one way or another; he 
evens threatens, “You see, I am quite serious” as he squeezes her arm so tightly his fingerprints 
“purpled into view” (125). After pouring daiquiris into her, Marco forces Esther to the dance floor 
against her will where she is completely in his control, “without any will or knowledge of [her] own” 
and feeling herself “blow and bend like a tree in the wind” (126). She continues to succumb to his 
will until he leads her outside and almost immediately pushes her to the ground, rips her clothes, 
and throws himself on top of her “as if he would grind his body through [her] and into the mud” 
(128). The helplessness she feels in her environment not only emphasizes but also contributes to the 
inner turmoil Esther faces in forging her own identity. 
Esther’s lack of control cannot be solely attributed to her illness, for as her encounter with Marco 
demonstrates, this body problem is also intertwined with her identity as a woman. In her article 
“(Re)fusing the Amputated Body: An Interactionist Bridge for Feminism and Disability,” Alexa 
Schriempf argues that disabled women face compounded oppressions, for they often encounter 
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both a “sexist bias” and an “ableist bias” (54). This is also true for Esther; in addition to the 
stigmatization she faces in response to her mental distress, Marco is a reminder of the sexist bias 
she must face as well. Schriempf primarily discusses visible physical disabilities, describing how a 
disabled woman often “must not only fight to be the author of her own sexuality” but must fight to 
“establish a sexuality in the first place” (57). Although Esther does not have to establish her sexuality 
in the same way as physically disabled women (who are often denied any sexuality at all), she does 
fight against the conventions and expectations of her society to be the author of it. For instance, 
after learning that Buddy Willard has already had sex, she decides she must have sex with someone 
as well, despite her mother’s insistence that she wait until marriage, but “Buddy wouldn’t count, 
though, because he would still be one person ahead of [her], it would have to be someone else” 
(92). First she fantasizes about being seduced by Constantin, the simultaneous interpreter she 
meets in New York City, and even when Marco throws himself on top of her, she thinks, “If I just lie 
here and do nothing it will happen” (129). Her quest to establish her sexuality does not end with 
Marco, though, for she manages to fight him off. Then, when she returns to her room, she throws 
her clothes from a balcony, watching them float away beyond her control: “Piece by piece, I fed my 
wardrobe to the night wind, and flutteringly, like a loved one’s ashes, the gray scraps were ferried 
off, to settle here, there, exactly where I would never know, in the dark heart of New York” (132). 
Perhaps, as Linda W. Wagner suggests, the act of “[t]hrowing out her clothes is tantamount to 
rejecting the traditional image of pretty, smart girl, object for man’s acquisition” (61). This 
traditional image, and the expectations of that role, further complicate Esther’s attempt at 
establishing her identity. 
Yet Esther’s search for her own identity as a woman extends far beyond authoring her sexuality and 
is complicated by the time period in which she lives. Many scholars have discussed Esther’s struggle 
against the oppression young women faced in the 1950s. Wagner, for instance, identifies Esther’s 
“battle against submission to the authority of both older people and, more pertinently, men” as one 
of the primary themes of the novel
3
 (57). Esther feels many of the people in her life encouraging her 
to inhabit an identity she is not comfortable with, one of domesticity and submission to men. Her 
mother tries to convince Esther to learn shorthand, so that she can find a job after graduation, 
“transcrib[ing] letter after thrilling letter” for employers (presumably men), but Esther “hated the 
idea of serving men in any way” (89).  Buddy Willard also tries to shape her into a suitable wife, 
telling her that she “wouldn’t want to write poems any more” after she got married and had 
children (100).  However, to Esther, the example of domestic life she saw in her mother and Mrs. 
Willard “seemed a dreary and wasted life for a girl with fifteen years of straight A’s” (99), and she 
decided that getting married and having children was “like being brainwashed, and afterward you 
went about numb as a slave” (100). As Marjorie Perloff argues, Esther’s “repeated attempts…to find 
both a female model whom she can emulate and a man whom she need not despise” (512) are 
unsuccessful. Although she has many choices for both a female model—such her mother and Mrs. 
Willard—as well as for potential husbands, including her boyfriend Buddy who has already 
proposed, none offers a life free of patriarchal oppression. Her inability to construct a suitable, 




Frank reminds that contingency, the “condition of being subject to forces that cannot be controlled” 
(31), is a condition of life for everyone though it is not commonly recognized as such. As Frank 
points out, “[p]eople define themselves in terms of their body’s varying capacity for control” (30). 
Susan Wendell also discusses cultural desires for control: “A physical ideal gives us the goal of our 
efforts to control the body, and the myth that total control is possible deceives us into striving for 
the ideal” (“Toward a Feminist Theory” 249). However, as Frank notes, recognition of the inherent 
contingency of life—most often brought on by disability—can be overwhelming, often involving “a 
crisis of control” (30). Esther is not the first young woman to suffer disappointment or even rape, 
but the contingency she experiences extends beyond these outside forces. As she returns home 
from her guest editorship in New York City and edges closer to the nervous breakdown, she begin to 
lose control of her own body and mind in multiple ways. For instance, when she tries to read, her 
“eyes sank through an alphabet soup of letters” (147), and when she attempts to write a letter, her 
“hand made big, jerky letters like those of a child” (154). Furthermore, she cannot sleep, even after 
her family doctor prescribes sleeping medication. Then, when she tries to articulate her condition to 
this doctor, Esther finds herself unable to do so: “the zombie voice rose up in my throat and choked 
me off” (149). In her depression, Esther continually loses control of her body, fostering her sense of 
separation from it. 
Frank sums up this problem of body-relatedness with a question: “Do I have a body, or am I a 
body?” describing the two possible reactions as associating with or dissociating from the body (33). 
Although Frank places more value in associating with one’s body, he does recognize dissociation as a 
common response to illness/disability, and Esther’s character offers multiple examples of such a 
reaction. For instance, before her admission to the hospitals, she repeatedly refers to her own voice 
as “the zombie voice” or “the hollow voice” (140), as though it does not belong to her at all. 
Furthermore, in considering methods of suicide, she quickly rules out slitting her wrists: “the skin of 
my wrist looked so white and defenseless that I couldn’t do it. It was as if what I wanted to kill 
wasn’t in that skin…but somewhere else, deeper, more secret, and a whole lot harder to get at” 
(176). When she decides to do it anyway, she is unable to will her body to move and perceives “the 
person in the mirror” as someone separate from herself, “paralyzed and too stupid to do a thing” 
(176). Susan Coyle, in examining metaphors in the novel, notes that the physical images with which 
Esther describes herself show that she is “increasingly dissociated from herself, until a sense of the 
‘other’ is clearly established” (162). As her depression worsens, Esther’s sense of identity becomes 
more separated from her body, situating herself as “having a body” rather than “being a body.” 
Other disability scholars have observed the recurring issue of body-relatedness in disability 
narratives. Kristen Lindgren argues that dissociation from the body is not unique to the experience 
of disability; in fact, for a healthy, nondisabled person, ignoring the body is easy. However, Lindgren 
notes that illness and disability complicate this assumption of dissociation, for “[t]he notion of 
having a body implies that the self exercises control over and even ownership of the body. Illness 
and disability reveal that the body has a mind of its own” (151-52). Likewise, Esther continually 
describes her body as something separate from and opposed to herself; when she attempts to hang
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herself, she finds her will sabotaged by her body’s: “Then I saw that my body had all sorts of little 
tricks…which would save it, time and again, whereas if I had the whole say, I would be dead in a 
flash” (189). Esther continually sees her body as not only separate from her sense of self, but also as 
antagonist, interfering with her plans, from writing a letter to committing suicide. Nancy Mairs also 
describes a similar relationship with her body as she developed M.S.: 
In effect, living with this mysterious mechanism feels like having your present self, and 
the past selves it embodies, haunted by a capricious and meanspirited ghost, unseen 
except for its footprints, which trips you even when you’re watching where you’re 
going, knocks glassware out of your hand, squeezes the urine out of your bladder before 
you reach the bathroom, and weights your whole body with a weariness no amount of 
rest can relieve. An alien invader must be at work. But of course it’s not. It’s your own 
body. That is, it’s you. (53) 
Like Esther, Mairs at least initially perceives her body as separate from herself, as an antagonistic 
“other.” As Mairs notes, disassociation and bodily self-hatred are common experiences for women 
in patriarchal societies; for instance, she describes the shame she feels from “falling short of an 
unattainable standard” of feminine beauty (55). However, these phenomena become even more 
intense in the experiences of disabled women. 
Like body-relatedness, the problem of other-relatedness also produces two typical reactions, 
becoming a dyadic body, recognizing the interconnectedness of itself with other bodies, and 
becoming a monadic body, “understanding itself as existentially separate and alone” (Frank 36). 
Esther, a monadic body, begins to withdraw from those around her after returning from New York, 
passing on the opportunity to attend summer school despite her rejection from the writing class and 
ending her relationship with her boyfriend Buddy Willard. She believes her condition is hopeless, 
“incurable” (189), and will only leave her isolated and alone. For instance, when beginning therapy 
with Dr. Gordon, she can only anticipate being hospitalized, visited at first by family and friends until 
“their visits would slacken off, and they would give up hope” (190). She feels alienated not only from 
herself, but also from those around her. 
As with all disability and illness narratives, Esther’s perception of herself as her depression worsens 
is largely affected by the perceptions and reactions of others. By many strangers, Esther is 
continually regarded with either fear or interest. For instance, after attempting suicide, she is moved 
from one hospital to another that has a ward for mental illnesses. Though her roommate in this new 
hospital is initially friendly, she quickly changes upon learning that Esther has tried to kill herself, for 
“she lowered her voice and whispered something [Esther] couldn’t hear…and somebody stepped 
out and pulled the bed curtain between [them] like a white wall” (212). Although this woman is also 
a patient in the mental hospital (which she says is “on account of [her] French-Canadian mother-in-
law”), she exhibits an unnatural fear of Esther. For other strangers, however, Esther serves as a sort 
of spectacle, similar to the American freak show phenomenon which Thomson discusses at length. 
Freak shows presented the disabled body as “a spectacle—sympathetic, grotesque, wondrous, or 
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pathological,” the object of the “stare” (Extraordinary Bodies 136).
4
 Esther is often the object of the 
stare, as when a black hospital employee comes to deliver the patients’ meals and “he gawked at us 
with big, rolling eyes.  I could tell we were his first crazy people” (215). Furthermore, when George 
Bakewell, a boy from Esther’s church whom she barely knew, comes to visit her in the hospital, she 
receives the same stare, “as if I were some exciting new zoo animal,” and says, “He didn’t really 
know me, either. He just wanted to see what a girl who was crazy enough to kill herself looked like” 
(207). Even since the decline of the American freak show, Thomson notes that “the stare is the 
dominant mode of looking at disability in this culture” (“Dares to Stares” 31). The stare is also the 
most common response to “invisible disabilities” such as Esther’s, for such conditions “always 
threaten to disclose some inexplicable stigma, however subtle, that undoes the social order by its 
presence” (31). Although her mental distress is an invisible disability, her hospitalization reveals its 
existence, eliciting both fear and curiosity from those around her. 
The reactions of those who knew her before the breakdown, particularly those of her mother, are 
markedly different but equally prejudicial, often laying blame on Esther for her condition. Thomson, 
citing Melvin Lerner’s “just world” theory, argues that such reactions are common; there is often the 
assumption that “if something ‘bad’—like having a disability—happens to someone, then there must 
be some ‘good’ reason” (36), some fault on the part of the victim. After Esther’s first electroshock 
treatment, her mother is elated to hear Esther proclaim that she no longer wants to see Dr. Gordon, 
assuming Esther had “decide[d] to be all right again,” unlike “those awful dead people at that 
hospital” (174). Her mother seems to believe that Esther could “get better” by sheer force of will, 
ignoring the reality of her daughter’s mental distress. Then, after her suicide attempt, Esther objects 
to being moved to another hospital against her will, and her mother says, “You should have behaved 
better, then” (210). Her mother does not recognize the lack of control Esther feels. In fact, she 
initially assumes that volunteer work will cure Esther depression, as “the cure for thinking too much 
about yourself was helping somebody who was worse off than you” (192). By identifying the cause 
of Esther’s distress as a preoccupation with herself, Mrs. Greenwood is also blaming Esther for her 
condition. 
Esther’s perception of herself and her illness is also largely shaped by her interactions with the 
medical/mental health field. As G. Thomas Couser discusses in his book Recovering Bodies: Illness 
Disability, and Life Writing, there are many ways modern medicine complicates bodily experiences 
for the ill and disabled. Couser notes that “as the efficacy of U.S. medicine has increased public 
confidence in the medical establishment has decreased,” (10-11) and this dissatisfaction is 
expressed in numerous illness and disability narratives. Frank also recognizes that many such 
narratives “express suspicion of medicine’s reduction of their suffering to its general unifying view” 
(11). This same dissatisfaction is also seen in mental health users; as Wilson and Beresford point out, 
with the continued development of the “mental health service users/psychiatric system survivors 
movement” since the 1980s, “there are now clear and well-argued challenges to psychiatric 
orthodoxies from users’ perspectives” (143). Part of the problem is the language of medicine, or 
medical discourse, which Couser says “may obstruct rather than enhance empathy” (19). Esther 
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experiences this obstruction to empathy in her first session with Dr. Gordon, when he asks her to 
explain what she thinks is wrong. Esther’s suspicions are raised instantly: “What did I think was 
wrong? That made it sound as if nothing was really wrong, I only thought it was wrong” (154). While 
it can be argued that Esther’s interactions with Dr. Gordon are also shaded by gender bias, for 
perhaps he would speak to her differently if she were a man, disability narratives demonstrates that 
such interactions with medical professionals are common in disability experiences. Esther is further 
alienated from Dr. Gordon when, in future sessions, he continually asks about her college and the 
WAC station they used to have, as though he is more interested in her school than her. In fact, it 
seems Dr. Gordon says little else to her, for he does not explain her condition, or even describe her 
diagnosis to her. Couser argues that “one manifestation of medical authority is the control of 
information, keeping it from nonprofessional competitors and patients alike” (20). Similarly, Wilson 
and Beresford describe the tendency of psychiatric professionals to withhold information from 
patients as well, noting that in the UK prior to 1991, patients were not legally granted access to their 
medical records, and even now, this access is not absolute.
5
 This same tendency to withhold 
information from patients is also exhibited by Dr. Gordon, for even when Esther fails to show 
improvement and he decides she needs electroshock therapy, he does not explain anything to 
Esther. Instead, he tells her mother, and Esther does not know what to expect of the treatments 
until they begin. 
Sometimes the very language a doctor uses causes alienation from patients. Couser notes that 
physicians “establish, exercise, and perpetuate their power by means of the development and 
deployment of specialized language (‘expert-ese’)” (19). Often, this is most evident during diagnosis, 
when “doctors provide patients with an interpretation of their lives” (10). Kaysen describes this 
process of reinterpretation, as well as the way it complicates her experience: 
They had a special language: regression, acting out, hostility, withdrawal, indulging 
in behavior. This last phrase could be attached to any activity and make it sound 
suspicious: indulging in eating behavior, talking behavior, writing behavior. In the 
outside world people ate and talked and wrote, but nothing we did was simple. (84) 
When described using the doctors’ “special language,” Kaysen finds her own experiences 
complicated, even suspicious. One of the negative effects of modern medical advancements and 
technologies that Couser identifies is the tendency “to discount patient testimony” (21). Wilson and 
Beresford also note that medical professionals, both psychiatrists and general practitioners, 
generally do not allow patients “to contribute to the writing of ‘their own’ record” (148), offering an 
example in which one of the authors’ own written account of “the events leading to her diagnosis” 
was omitted from her file with the explanation that “to have made reference to it or included it 
‘would have sanctioned its content” (149). This tendency of medical professionals to discount 
patient testimony can lead patients to distrust their own feelings and experiences, as in Kaysen’s 
case. Esther also has her own testimony discounted by doctors, first by Dr. Gordon when she tells 
him she is “the same” and he “quirked an eyebrow, as if he didn’t believe it” (160). Then, when she 
is being moved from Caplan to Belsize in the final hospital, she voices concern that she is not ready, 
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but her concerns are quickly dismissed: “Of course, you’re well enough. Don’t worry, they wouldn’t 
be moving you if you weren’t” (245). Here Esther is expected to ignore her own feelings and trust 
the decision of the doctors. 
Medical institutions often have other effects on their patients. For instance, Wendell argues that 
“there are often hierarchies of power and value in rehabilitative institutions, with those who act 
most like the non-disabled at the top, and those who have least control of their bodies at the 
bottom” (The Rejected Body 61). Esther noticed this in Caplan, when a fellow patient was being 
moved to Wymark, a building for more severe cases, and the nurse told her, “I’m afraid Miss Norris 
isn’t moving up like you” (232). By blatantly comparing the progress of the two patients, the nurse is 
perpetuating a hierarchy of patients based on severity of condition and progress. Furthermore, 
when Esther begins to “improve” and is moved to Belsize, she finds herself on the bottom of this 
system again, for compared to the other patients in this ward, her condition is the most severe. 
Although the nurse in Belsize is much more friendly with the patients than the staff in the other 
wards, Esther is treated differently. The nurse chats and jokes with the other patients, even playing 
games with them, but Esther is not included. When attempting to participate in the conversation, 
Esther is reminded of her place: “The nurse gave me a straight look, and I could see she thought I 
had no business in Belsize at all” (250). 
As Wendell points out, these hierarchies can also be internalized by the patients themselves, causing 
ill/disabled people to “make each other ‘the Other’” (The Rejected Body 61). Esther experiences 
such treatment from her friend Joan, who was a fellow patient in Caplan. Joan seemed to improve 
faster and is moved to Belsize before Esther, but when Esther joins her there, Joan regards Esther 
very differently: “She [Joan] seemed perfectly at home among these women and treated me coolly, 
with a slight sneer, like a dim and inferior acquaintance” (247). Because Esther has not progressed at 
the same rate, she has not “moved up” as fast, Joan now feels superior to her. However, once Esther 
begins electroshock treatments again and improves, she surpasses Joan, and the dynamics of their 
relationship are reversed, as Joan began to hang around Esther “like a large and breathless fruitfly—
as if the sweetness of recovery were something she could suck up by mere nearness” (258). The 
same division among patients is seen in Girl, Interrupted, for Kaysen describes one girl who had set 
herself on fire and was now disfigured, saying “Who would kiss a person like that, a person with no 
skin?” (18). This girl is not a part of Kaysen’s group, for she and her friends knew they “might get out 
sometime, but she was locked up forever in that body” (19), imagining a superiority in this 
distinction. As both Esther’s and Kaysen’s experiences demonstrate, the hierarchies established by 
medical discourse often translate into prejudice among patients. 
The final body problem Frank identifies is that of desire. Frank says that for most bodies, desire can 
never be satisfied, for “desire is always wanting more” (38). However, he argues that for ill and 
disabled bodies, desire is sometimes lacking, and “the initial loss of desire is expressed in 
indifference to such mundane acts as keeping up one’s footwear and teeth” because “the ill person 
fears he is no longer worth clean teeth and new shoes” (38-39). It is not surprising, given her 
condition, that Esther exhibits a lack of desire, for depression is almost by definition a lack of desire. 
20 
 
By her last night in New York City, Esther is already experiencing a loss of desire, as she lacks 
motivation to complete even simple tasks. Even packing her suitcase is a difficult act, for she says 
her clothes “seemed to have a separate, mulish identity of their own that refused to be washed and 
folded and stowed” (123). Although she displaces the blame to inanimate objects, Esther’s problem 
with desire is evident. After returning home, Esther seems to have lost all desire, finding herself 
unable to even get out of bed: “I couldn’t see the point of getting up. I had nothing to look forward 
to” (139). Any task she undertakes, from writing a novel to working on her thesis, seems futile and 
useless. By the time she is referred to her first psychiatrist, her personal hygiene has begun to suffer 
as well: 
I was still wearing Betsy’s white blouse and dirndl skirt. They drooped a bit now, as I 
hadn’t washed them in my three weeks at home. The sweaty cotton gave off a sour 
but friendly smell.  I hadn’t washed my hair for three weeks, either…The reason I 
hadn’t washed my clothes or my hair was because it seemed so silly….It seemed silly 
to wash one day when I would only have to wash again the next. It made me tired 
just to think of it. (151-52) 
Because of her almost complete lack of desire, Esther can no longer bring herself to bathe or change 
her clothes. Unlike dyadic bodies, who Frank says remain productive of desire through service, 
Esther is unable to “be a body for other bodies” (40). Even when her mother pushes her to 
volunteer at the local hospital, she finds no joy in service; she is disappointed that the patients are 
awake, having hoped “they would be sleeping, or lying quiet and pale, so [she] could tiptoe round 
without any trouble” (193). As she does not even make it through her first full day as a volunteer, it 






Wilson and Beresford describe many responses to “mental illness” that demonstrate Douglas’ 
theory. For instance, they note that mental health users are assigned absolute labels, saying that in 
their own experience, “our transgressions from the ‘psychonorm’ have been documented and 
preserved in perpetuity in medical/psychiatric records which continue to impact upon our lives long 
after they were written” (145). Furthermore, they describe the media and general public “emphasis 
on the ‘dangerousness’ of mental health users” (143). In fact, according to Beresford in his 2000 
article “What Have Madness and Psychiatric System Survivors Got to Do with Disability and Disability 
Studies?” “‘Public safety’ is now explicitly the central concern of government mental health policy” 
(168). As evidence, Beresford points to imposed “compulsory treatments,” a “renewed 
commitment” to institutionalization, and “planned provisions to imprison people included in the 
junk category of ‘personality disorder’ who have not been convicted of any offense” (168). 
2
Ames notes that Plath described her novel as autobiographical, and many of the elements of 
Esther’s life are true to Plath’s own experiences. For instance, Plath “spent her early years in 
Winthrop, a seaside town close to Boston” (293), and Esther also lives in a suburb of Boston. The 
family make-up is also similar, for like Esther, Plath’s father died when she was young, leaving her a 
mother and brother. Although Esther’s brother does not appear in the novel, she does refer to him 
occasionally. The description of Esther’s father, however, is very similar to Plath own father, for, 
when visiting her father’s grave, Esther thinks that if her father hadn’t died, “he would have taught 
[her] all about insects, which was his specialty as the university” (196-97). Plath’s own father, who 
was also a professor, was “an internationally known authority on bees” (293). Furthermore, just as 
Plath’s father died from a long, difficult illness, Esther’s father died mercifully (according to her 
mother), for “if he had lived he would have been crippled an invalid for life” (198). Like Esther, Plath 
was also awarded a guest editorship in New York City; in 1952, Plath “was chosen to be a guest 
editor in Mademoiselle’s College Board Contest” (296). Plath also suffered a nervous breakdown and 
received electroshock therapy before returning to college to reconquer “old broncos that threw me 
for a loop last year” (qtd. in Ames 301). We are told that Esther has been accepted back to her 
college for the next semester, and we can only assume that she also reconquered “old broncos.” 
After submitting her manuscript of The Bell Jar and moving to London, Plath describes the novel to a 
friend as “an autobiographical apprentice work” (qtd. in Ames 308), and the similarities between her 
own experiences and Esther’s certainly serve of evidence of this. 
3
Linda W. Wagner argues in “Plath’s The Bell Jar as Female Bildungsroman” that this novel has two 
primary themes: that of Esther’s “battle against submission” and that of her “developing identity, or 
lack of it” (56-57). 
4
In the third chapter of her book Extraordinary Bodies, Thomson discusses American freak shows in 
which the disabled body was treated as “a spectacle—sympathetic, grotesque, wondrous, or 
pathological” (136). Offering numerous examples, Thomson outlines the history of the freak show of 
museums and circuses from 1835 to 1940, which she argues “descended from a tradition of reading 
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the extraordinary body” that she traces back as far as Stone Age cave drawing that “record the 
births of the mysterious and marvelous bodies the Greeks and early scientists would later call 
‘monsters,’ the culture of P.T. Barnum would call ‘freaks,’ and we now call ‘the congenitally 
physically disabled’” (56). By the mid-twentieth century, modern medicine began to “[govern] the 
production of freaks,” replacing the American freak show (75). 
5
Wilson and Beresford note that before 1991, patients were not granted access to their medical 
records, and even with the passing of Access to Medical Reports Act (1988) and Access to Medical 
Records Act (1990) in the UK, this access is not absolute. For instance, the authors point out that the 
Access to Medical Records Act generally does not apply to records before 1991. Furthermore, under 
each of these acts, information may be withheld “if, ‘in the opinion of the practitioner, such 










Despite the uncertainty which clouds the conclusion of The Bell Jar, most scholars read the ending as 
an optimistic one.
1
 As Esther is waiting nervously for her interview with the board of doctors, hoping 
to be released, the description of her appearance shows marked improvement from her first 
meeting with Dr. Gordon: “My stocking seams were straight, my black shoes cracked, but polished, 
and my red wool suit flamboyant as my plans” (290). She has replaced the drooping clothes and sour 
smell and now appears “polished” and “flamboyant,” ready to re-enter society and restart her own 
life. However, she also expresses anxiety, despite her desire to “feel sure and knowledgeable about 
everything that lay ahead”; instead, she says, “all I could see were question marks” (290). But even 
question marks and uncertainty are preferable to the despair from which she is returning. She also 
describes herself as “being born twice—patched, retreaded and approved for the road,” ready to 
walk through the open door before her (290), which Wagner says “are surely positive images” (64). 
Likewise, Perloff assumes Esther’s treatment has been successful, hailing her “an authentic, indeed 
an exemplary heroine of the seventies” (521-22), and E. Miller Budick argues that the tire imagery 
signals Esther’s rebirth, claiming that “Esther realizes that she cannot be born anew. But she can be 
healed” (883). Much of the apprehension Esther faces in the hospital and returning to her life are 
related to the task of finding a role in society free of patriarchal oppression, but this anxiety is also 
related to her experience of mental distress; while the tone of the final chapter does seem hopeful 
at the very least, the question marks Esther sees in her future remind that there is no guarantee she 
is, in fact, “healed.” 
Such uncertainty regarding the body’s future is common for many ill and disabled people. According 
to Frank, people with conditions similar to that of Esther’s are part of what he terms the remission 
society, those who are “effectively well but could never be considered cured” (8). This category 
includes many conditions: 
Members of the remission society include those who have had almost any cancer, 
those living in cardiac recovery programs, diabetics, those whose allergies and 
environmental sensitivities require dietary and other self-monitoring, those with 
24 
 
prostheses and mechanical body regulators, the chronically ill, the disabled, those 
‘recovering’ from abuses and addictions, and for all these people, the families that 
share the worries and daily triumph of staying well. (8) 
Although Frank does not explicitly name mental distress in this list, a glance at the other conditions 
identified suggests its implicit inclusion. Furthermore, if the remission society includes anyone who 
is concerned with “staying well,” Esther clearly qualifies. In contemplating her pending release, she 
says, “I wasn’t sure at all. How did I know that someday—at college, in Europe, somewhere, 
anywhere—the bell jar, with its stifling distortions, wouldn’t descend again? (286). She is not merely 
uncertain about the life she is returning to, with college and relationships, but she is also worried 
about remaining well and staying out from under the bell jar. Kaysen also describes similar concerns 
with staying well, often wondering if she is crazy: “I still think about it. I’ll always have to think about 
it” (159). Although they have undergone treatment and been released, both Esther and Kaysen have 
become members of the remission society, sharing “the worries and daily triumph of staying well.” 
In many ways, Esther’s experiences in The Bell Jar correlate with common experiences of disability, 
and for this reason, disability theory can also be a useful critical tool in reading this novel. In addition 
to enriching our understanding of the novel, such a reading demonstrates the interconnections and 
overlap between Esther’s struggles as a woman and her experience of mental distress. These 
apparent overlaps between experiences of disability and femaleness may seem to suggest that to be 
female in a patriarchal society is in some sense disabling; in fact, according to Thomson, “[m]ore 
recently, feminist theorists have argued that female embodiment is a disabling condition in sexist 
culture” (260).
2
 However, despite the parallels between femaleness and disability, these parallels 
are not absolute. As scholars such as Thomson, Wendell, and Schriempf argue, disabled women face 
compounded oppressions, as they are stigmatized not only for their difference as women but also 
for their physical, mental, or emotional differences. Schriempf argues that when scholars include 
disabled women “under the general rubric of ‘woman,’” they fail to recognized and acknowledge 
“the different experiences of disabled women in a sexist and ableist society” (54). Likewise, to 
include all women in the category of “disabled” ignores the unique experiences, struggles, and 
concerns of disabled women. Although Esther’s disabling experience of mental distress is largely 
shaped by the oppressions she faces as a woman, to view her as “disabled” because she is a woman 
is to ignore the ways in which her experience of mental distress is a stigmatizing experience in itself, 





One scholar who disagrees with such an optimistic reading of the ending is Diane S. Bonds. In her 
article, “The Separative Self in Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar,” she is critical of other scholars who accept 
the “retreaded tire” image as at face value as a purely positive image, ignoring that the tire 
“presents us with a utilitarian object, easily repaired or replaced, as a metaphor for woman” (54). 
She goes on to point out that a “patched, retreaded tire may be ready for the road, but somewhere 
down the highway the owner can expect a flat” (54), suggesting that Esther’s “cure” may not be 
absolute. Ultimately, Bonds argues that Esther’s new life following her rebirth is not so new after all, 
associating “Esther’s new lease on life with the role expectations that contributed to her breakdown 
in the first place”—marriage and family, or “domestic servitude” (54). 
2
As an example, Thomson discusses Iris Marion Young, who asserts that, in a patriarchal society, 
women are “physically handicapped” by culturally enforced expectations of femaleness, which rob 
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